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THE TWO FEDERAL CIRCUITS
R. Polk Wagner*
This Article explores the institutional characteristics of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and places the court’s role in
context. The most important institutional question facing the court
today involves choosing between two approaches to implementing its
special role in the patent system—in one, the court acts as a “decider”
of cases, and in the other, it acts as a “manager” of the jurisprudence.
It is the choice between these two roles—decisional and managerial—
that largely defines the work of the Federal Circuit, and many (if not
all) of the jurisprudential debates in patent law can be traced to an
ongoing struggle between and among the judges of the court with
respect to these roles. Exploring this role duality is necessary to a
complete understanding of the Federal Circuit as an institution.

I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has always
occupied a unique position in the institutional landscape of our legal
system—a specialized court with a nonetheless remarkable breadth
of jurisdiction, a relatively unknown court with its hand on the levers
of America’s innovation economy. 1 And it has of course always been
controversial. 2
Beyond the debates about the court’s performance, the story of
the Federal Circuit is one primarily of institutional design choices.
*

Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1. See generally FRED WARSHOFSKY, THE PATENT WARS: THE BATTLE TO OWN THE
WORLD’S TECHNOLOGY (1994) (noting the critical nature of patents in economic development).
2. See Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit-1981: Hearing on H.R. 2405 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
97th Cong. 69 (1981) (testimony of James W. Geriak) (“[I]t would be a very, very substantial
error for the subcommittee to conclude that all patent lawyers are agreed upon the desirability of
the . . . Federal Circuit legislation.”); see, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A
Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989); Craig Allen Nard & John F.
Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. L. REV. 1619 (2007) (arguing for
more decentralization in patent law’s judicial architecture); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge,
Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U.
PENN. L. REV. 1105 (2004).
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Has this “sustained experiment in specialization” (to use Professor
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss’s apt description) 3 yielded a jurisprudence
that is clearer, more coherent, and more predictable than otherwise?
As Professor Lee Petherbridge and I asked five years ago:
This mandate gives rise to the obvious (yet surprisingly
ephemeral) question concerning the Federal Circuit’s role
in the patent system: is it succeeding? Has the mandate
been fulfilled? Has this grand experiment in allocating
judicial authority resulted in clearer, more consistent, more
coherent rules surrounding patents? 4
I (and others) have offered some tentative observations on this
subject and have offered a variety of suggestions for reform. But this
outstanding conference, I think, allows the opportunity to step back
and consider the Federal Circuit not merely on the basis of its
output—that is, its performance in patent law—but instead on the
basis of its institutional characteristics and how they in turn impact
the output. Put another way, what is it about the Federal Circuit as an
institution that can help us to understand and explain the patterns that
we see in its work? This is important: any serious analysis of the
Federal Circuit’s role in the patent system (and thus the institutional
design of the nation’s innovation policy) should understand not only
what the Federal Circuit does but what it is.
To no small degree, this Article revises and expands upon
Dreyfuss’s earlier, seminal work. 5 But my take is slightly different—
my sense of the last twenty years is that the most important moving
part is not so much the specialization of the court along subject
matter lines but instead the emergence of two distinct understandings
of the court’s role in patent law, and how that role should be
reflected in its decisions. It is only by understanding this conflict that
we can place the court’s institutional role in context.
3. Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 3.
4. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 2, at 1108; see S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 4–6 (1981),
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 14–16 (stating that the creation of a centralized court to hear
suits related to patents will provide doctrinal stability in the field of patent law, which will
decrease unnecessary uncertainties in the patent system and thereby increase innovation);
COMM’N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL
PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1975), reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195, 220 (1975)
(“The additional appellate capacity for nationally binding decisions which a national court of
appeals would provide can be expected to fulfill [the monitoring] function [over the complex area
of patent law and policy].”).
5. Dreyfuss, supra note 2.
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Hence the title: The Two Federal Circuits. The thesis here is that
the most important institutional question facing the Federal Circuit is
fundamentally about a choice between two approaches to
implementing its special role in the patent system and thus its
approach to patent law. As I describe in more detail in Part II below,
I denote these two approaches as one in which the court acts as a
“decider” of cases, and another in which the court acts as a
“manager” of the jurisprudence. My argument in this Article is that it
is the choice between these two roles—decisional and managerial—
that largely defines the work of the Federal Circuit, and that many (if
not all) of the jurisprudential debates in patent law can be traced to
an ongoing struggle between and among the judges of the court with
respect to these roles.
The balance of this very brief Article moves in three parts. In
Part II, I outline the theory of the two Federal Circuits. In Part III, I
offer some examples of the duality in action, noting areas in the
court’s jurisprudence where it has exposed its dual nature. Finally, I
conclude by offering some observations on what this split might
mean for the court.
II. THE TWO FEDERAL CIRCUITS
From the outset, the Federal Circuit has been an intriguing
experiment in institutional innovation. Formed by the passage of the
Federal Courts Improvement Act (FCIA) in 1982, 6 the Federal
Circuit was established as the exclusive venue for patent appeals,
whether from decisions of the U.S. district courts or the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO). The core idea here—unifying
appellate jurisdiction under a single, nationwide court—was seen as
an effective, albeit untested, 7 response to the widespread perception
that the legal infrastructure of patent law was not being effectively

6. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
7. See Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 3 (describing the FCIA as “a sustained experiment in
specialization”). Dreyfuss has noted that even before 1982, there had been other efforts to
implement specialized tribunals (even at the appellate level), such as the U.S. Court of Military
Appeals, the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court of Appeals, the Bankruptcy Courts, the Tax Court, the Court of International Trade, and the
Claims Court (later the U.S. Court of Claims). See id. at 3 n.17; Charles W. Adams, The Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit: More Than a National Patent Court, 49 MO. L. REV. 43, 46 n.18
(1984).
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managed, whether by the USPTO 8 or by the regional circuit courts of
appeals. 9 This confusion (or the perception thereof) 10 led to the view
that patent rights were being eroded, that forum shopping was
driving much patent litigation, and that the administrative agency
(the USPTO) was out of sync with the courts on matters of patent
law. 11 Further, as of 1982, the Supreme Court had not shown
substantial interest in exercising a managerial role in patent law. 12
Thus, the reasons for the Federal Circuit’s creation are widely
understood: focusing (appellate) power in patent law would allow
this law to be managed and developed in a unified way, 13 which
would yield a clearer, more coherent, and more predictable legal
doctrine, reduce forum shopping and related litigation, and at
minimum, stabilize the patent grant. 14
8. See Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 6 (“Since [the PTO] . . . was free to develop its own
notions of patentability but could not impose them on other federal courts, its decisions did not
command the respect of the judiciary.”).
9. See id. at 6–7 (describing the problems with regional circuit review of patent validity);
Adams, supra note 7, at 54–57 (noting the regional circuits’ disparate standards for patentability).
10. See Cecil D. Quillen, Jr., Innovation and the U.S. Patent System, 1 VA. L. & BUS. REV.
207, 228 (2006) (arguing that forum shopping and outcome variability were not notable problems
in the 1970s).
11. See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 4–6 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 14–16
(stating that the creation of a centralized court to hear suits related to patents will provide
doctrinal stability in the field of patent law, which will decrease unnecessary uncertainties in the
patent system and thereby increase innovation); COMM’N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT
APPELLATE SYS., STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE
(1975), reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195, 220 (1975) (“The additional appellate capacity for nationally
binding decisions which a national court of appeals would provide can be expected to fulfill [the
monitoring] function [over the complex area of patent law and policy].”).
12. See Adams, supra note 7, at 45 (“With an increasing volume of petitions for certiorari,
the Supreme Court is less able to resolve conflicts between the circuits.”); Dreyfuss, supra note 2,
at 6 (“Perhaps because of its own docket problems and its lack of expertise, the Supreme Court
rarely reviewed the patent law decisions of the regional circuits.”). By the mid-2000s, the
Supreme Court had reasserted a role in the patent law. See, e.g., Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735
(2009) (granting certiorari); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007); MedImmune,
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388
(2006); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
13. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20–23 (1981) (detailing the Federal Circuit’s primary
role in increasing uniformity in patent law); see also Adams, supra note 7, at 62 (“[The FCIA]
has enhanced uniformity in patent law by providing a central forum for deciding patent
appeals . . . .”); Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 7 (noting that the FCIA attempted to resolve the
problems of USPTO arbitrariness and divergence of law across regional circuits “by creating a
single forum to hear appeals from most patent disputes”).
14. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20–23 (1981) (predicting these benefits with the advent of
the new court); S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15
(expecting that the new court would “increase doctrinal stability” and “produce desirable
uniformity” in patent law); see also Adams, supra note 7, at 62 (stating that, through greater
uniformity in patent law, the FCIA “thus has decreased the incentive for litigants to engage in
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As Dreyfuss argued in her seminal work on the Federal Circuit,
there are good reasons to question whether specialized courts are
likely to yield benefits. 15 Others, such as Professors John F. Duffy
and Craig Allen Nard, have argued that the Federal Circuit suffers
from isolation, and that the law would be better served by
introducing additional judges into the decision-making mixture. 16
This dimension of the debate about the Federal Circuit as an
institution—whether specialization is helpful or harmful to the law—
is both interesting and useful. But in my view, the most impactful
history of the Federal Circuit so far has been less about the
specialization of the court and instead about a related but distinct
issue: how the court’s role should be reflected in its decisions. That
is, setting aside whether the experiment of the Federal Circuit has
been successful or whether specialized courts more generally are a
good idea, there remains the critical question about how the
institution of the Federal Circuit should understand its input into
patent law. Here, it is useful to consider two ways that the court
might see itself: one, as a “decider”—a body tasked with
determining, as much as possible, that patent cases are decided
correctly—and two, as a “manager”—a steward of the law, ensuring
that the jurisprudence that emerges over time does so in as clear,
coherent, and predictable a manner as possible. My premise here is
that it is a choice between these two roles, call them “decisional” and
“managerial,” that largely defines the work of the court, and that
many (if not all) of the jurisprudential debates in patent law can be
traced to an ongoing struggle among the judges of the court with
respect to these roles.
As an initial matter, the identification of these two roles prompts
several points. The first is that these roles are not distinct in every
case. Indeed, one can argue that the entire project of legal decision
making is to align correctness of results with clarity and coherence of
explanation—or policy with process. Therefore, in many cases, the
approach to decision making that best manages the long-run
jurisprudence will also reach the correct result, however measured.
forum shopping”); Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 7 (“According to proponents of [the FCIA],
channelling patent cases into a single appellate forum would create a stable, uniform law and
would eliminate forum shopping. Greater certainty and predictability would foster technological
growth and industrial innovation and would facilitate business planning.” (citation omitted)).
15. Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 2–3.
16. Nard & Duffy, supra note 2, at 1649–51.
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But it is those circumstances where these roles diverge that create, I
suggest, a distinct choice for the judges—and thus the conflicts in
caselaw that we observe across the patent law landscape.
The second point here is that this choice between managerial
and decisional roles is not unique to the Federal Circuit. It is almost
certainly inherent in the nature of an appellate court to choose
between versions of these roles. Appellate courts, after all, are both
deciders of cases (ensuring the correctness of decisions) and
managers of legal doctrine. 17 But I think the role distinction is
especially stark and clear with respect to the Federal Circuit,
primarily because of that court’s role as the de facto sole and
exclusive source of legal doctrine in patent law. 18 The Federal
Circuit (quite by design) sits atop the patent law; this means that the
choice of roles is both more important than in other appellate
contexts, and that the judges of the Federal Circuit face this issue far
more often than they would if they were not being forced to resolve
so many patent cases. 19
My third clarifying point is that I think either of these two roles
is plainly defensible in the context of the Federal Circuit. That is, the
unique position of the Federal Circuit in patent law does not itself
answer the question of whether the court should be a decider of cases
or a manager of caselaw. It is reasonable to believe that the best
function of the Federal Circuit is to ensure that each patent case is
decided correctly—that each infringer pays, that each invalid patent
is struck down, and so forth. 20 But it is also reasonable to believe that
the court should downplay the results in specific cases and instead
work as hard as possible to articulate clear decisional rules that allow
others—such as district courts, patentees, and the public—to
understand and predict the outcome of cases. 21
III. MANAGERS AND DECIDERS IN ACTION
Again, to briefly recap the premise of this Article: I have
suggested that the Federal Circuit operates in two roles (in the
17. See generally Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 6–25.
18. The Supreme Court has been somewhat more active in recent years, but the vast bulk of
legal decision making in patent law is done by the Federal Circuit.
19. See generally Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 6–25.
20. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25.
21. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20–22 (1981); S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981),
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15; see also Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 6–8.
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context of patent law), the decisional role and the managerial role.
The decisional role emphasizes the importance of correctly deciding
the cases appealed to it—addressing questions such as whether the
facts were properly understood and whether the controlling legal
principle was properly applied. By contrast, in the managerial role,
the court focuses on articulating decisional rules that establish a
coherent body of law.
In this section, I trace this role duality in the jurisprudence of
patent law, specifically noting three areas where conflicts or
inconsistencies between cases have been widely noticed. Using the
framework noted above, I show how the confusion in the law can be
partly (if not mostly) explained by a conflict among the judges
regarding the role of the court.
A. Claim Construction
My first example is claim construction. As Petherbridge and I
(as well as many others) have documented, since the Supreme Court
decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 22 the Federal
Circuit has wavered (or bounced) between two distinct
methodological approaches. 23 The first, which we call “procedural,”
emphasizes a more formal, strict, plain-meaning approach to claim
construction. 24 The second, which we call “holistic,” is a more openended, all-encompassing approach, emphasizing the context of the
claim term as a means of ascertaining meaning. 25 Under our findings,
the court has been roughly split along this dimension since
Markman—one reason we think the caselaw has been in some
turmoil. 26 This is one very clear example of the two Federal Circuits
in action.
A holistic approach to claim construction is a paradigmatic
example of the court acting as a decision maker. Here, the legal
question at hand—what a person of ordinary skill in the art would
understand the relevant claim term to mean—is a wholly contextual
exercise, to be accomplished in different ways in each case,
22. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
23. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 2, at 1111.
24. Id. at 1133–34.
25. Id. at 1134.
26. Id. at 1148; see also R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change
Anything? Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence 14
(2010) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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depending on the facts and circumstances involved. 27 In some cases,
a holistic approach will require reference to customary uses of
language; in others it will not. 28 Expert testimony may be considered
to bear upon the question. 29 Or it may not. Perhaps the prosecution
history, or related patents, can shed light on the matter. 30 Or not.
Maybe the operative limitations found by the court will appear in the
claim itself; 31 in other cases, they may be inferred from the
description of the invention found in the specification. 32 In short, the
holistic approach to claim construction is an open search for the
truth, defined for the purposes of that specific patented invention and
dispute. 33 In other words, it is a highly decisional exercise, where
caselaw matters less than the result.
27. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 2, at 1130–36. In Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415
F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the Federal Circuit noted,
[T]here is no magic formula or catechism for conducting claim construction. Nor is the
court barred from considering any particular sources or required to analyze sources in
any specific sequence, as long as those sources are not used to contradict claim
meaning that is unambiguous in light of the intrinsic evidence. . . . The sequence of
steps used by the judge in consulting various sources is not important; what matters is
for the court to attach the appropriate weight to be assigned to those sources in light of
the statutes and policies that inform patent law. In [prior caselaw], we did not attempt
to provide a rigid algorithm for claim construction, but simply attempted to explain
why, in general, certain types of evidence are more valuable than others.
Id. at 1324 (citations omitted).
28. See Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Renishaw
PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
29. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980–81 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(citing Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 546 (1871)); see also Vitronics Corp. v.
Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
30. See Inverness Med. v. Warner Lambert Co., 309 F.3d 1373, 1380–82 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(ambiguity of the prosecution history made it less relevant to claim construction); Athletic
Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., 73 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (ambiguity of the
prosecution history made it “unhelpful as an interpretive resource” for claim construction);
Lemelson v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
31. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314.
32. See id. at 1315; Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354,
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“In most cases, the best source for discerning the proper context of claim
terms is the patent specification wherein the patent applicant describes the invention.”);
Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also, e.g.,
Kinik Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 362 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The words of patent
claims have the meaning and scope with which they are used in the specification and the
prosecution history.”); Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1315 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (“[T]he best indicator of claim meaning is its usage in context as understood by one of skill
in the art at the time of invention.”).
33. In Phillips, the court explained that
there is no magic formula or catechism for conducting claim construction. Nor is the
court barred from considering any particular sources or required to analyze sources in
any specific sequence, as long as those sources are not used to contradict claim
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By contrast, the procedural approach to claim construction is an
example of the court acting as a manager of the caselaw—trying to
craft a legal doctrine that enables claim construction rules to be
discerned and applied across a large range of cases. 34 Here, the
results are less important than, for example, clarifying when a claim
term can be understood by reference to the specification and when it
cannot, or clarifying where the ordinary meaning of a claim can be
found.
One response to my argument here, of course, is that the Federal
Circuit recognized and responded to this in 2005 in Phillips v. AWH
Corp., in which it purported to eliminate the confusion in the caselaw
I noted above. 35 But in fact this is not the case. As Petherbridge and I
have found in follow-up work, the methodological split in claim
construction in the Federal Circuit has not changed in any
meaningful way. 36 Why this is the case turns out to be relatively
clear from a reading of the Phillips opinion, which is a masterful
example of contradictory rules hedged by multiple disclaimers that
the rules do not really matter. 37 In short, the Phillips case has not
joined the two Federal Circuits; it has enabled them—judges can find
language in Phillips to support a claim construction decision in either
a decisional or a managerial role. 38
B. The Doctrine of Equivalents
A second example of the Federal Circuit’s role duality is the
court’s jurisprudence on the doctrine of equivalents (DOE). The
DOE is a form of analysis that allows, in some cases, the scope of the
patent grant to expand beyond the patent claims themselves—to
encompass “equivalents” to the subject matter described in the
meaning that is unambiguous in light of the intrinsic evidence. . . . The sequence of
steps used by the judge in consulting various sources is not important; what matters is
for the court to attach the appropriate weight to be assigned to those sources in light of
the statutes and policies that inform patent law.
415 F.3d at 1324 (citations omitted).
34. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 2, at 1133–34; see also Neomagic Corp. v.
Trident Microsystems Inc., 287 F.3d 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2002); CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick
Corp., 288 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Johnson Worldwide Assocs. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985
(Fed. Cir. 1999).
35. 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
36. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 26, at 15–17.
37. See id. at 21–22.
38. See id.
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claims. The Supreme Court (the creator and nurturer of the DOE) has
typically described the doctrine as necessary to the functioning of the
patent system:
[C]ourts have . . . recognized that to permit imitation of a
patented invention which does not copy every literal detail
would be to convert the protection of the patent grant into a
hollow and useless thing. Such a limitation would leave
room for—indeed encourage—the unscrupulous copyist to
make unimportant and insubstantial changes and
substitutions in the patent which, though adding nothing,
would be enough to take the copied matter outside the
claim, and hence outside the reach of law. One who seeks
to pirate an invention, like one who seeks to pirate a
copyrighted book or play, may be expected to introduce
minor variations to conceal and shelter the piracy. Outright
and forthright duplication is a dull and very rare type of
infringement. To prohibit no other would place the inventor
at the mercy of verbalism and would be subordinating
substance to form. It would deprive him of the benefit of his
invention and would foster concealment rather than
disclosure of inventions, which is one of the primary
purposes of the patent system. 39
The DOE, as any student of patent law can tell you, has been a
controversial element in patent law. 40 Within the Federal Circuit, the
39. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
40. As might be imagined, there have been dissenters throughout—as exemplified by Judge
Learned Hand, writing in 1929:
It is plain that [the DOE] violates in theory the underlying and necessary principle that
the disclosure is open to the public save as the claim forbids, and that it is the claim
and that alone which measures the monopoly.
....
On the one hand, therefore, the claim is not to be taken at its face—however freely
construed—but its elements may be treated as examples of a class which may be
extended more or less broadly as the disclosure warrants, the prior art permits, and the
originality of the discovery makes desirable. On the other, it is not to be ignored as a
guide in ascertaining those elements of the disclosure which constitute the “invention,”
and without which there could be no patent at all. It is obviously impossible to set any
theoretic limits to such a doctrine, which indeed its origin forbids, since it is in
misericordiam to relieve those who have failed to express their complete meaning.
Somewhat the same process is indeed inherent in the interpretation of any verbal
expression, and perhaps the best that can be said is that in the case of patent claims
much greater liberties are taken than would be allowed elsewhere. Each case is
inevitably a matter of degree, as so often happens, and other decisions have little or no
value. The usual ritual, which is so often repeated and which has so little meaning, that
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DOE became a flash point of controversy in the late 1990s, when the
court wrestled with the related doctrine of “prosecution history
estoppel” (PHE). Indeed, when the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
vitality of the DOE in the face of substantial challenge in the 1995
case Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 41 it noted
its “concern . . . that the doctrine of equivalents . . . has taken on a
life of its own, unbounded by the patent claims. There can be no
denying that the doctrine of equivalents, when applied broadly,
conflicts with the definitional and public-notice functions of the
statutory claiming requirement.” 42
Accordingly, in Warner-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court noted
that several legal limitations on the DOE—most relevantly for our
purposes here, the doctrine of PHE—were to be used as a way to
limit the concerns noted above. 43 This in turn shifted the
jurisprudential debate to the doctrine of PHE, which revealed the
dueling roles of the Federal Circuit.
In general terms, the doctrine of PHE states that a patentee may
not recapture (via the DOE) subject matter that was surrendered
during patent prosecution. The basic idea here is relatively
straightforward: if patent documents are to provide public notice of
claims to subject matter, then a clear surrender of subject matter
should define unclaimed territory not subject to later claims of
equivalence. In fact, as I have argued elsewhere, the doctrine of PHE
has a much more significant role in the operation of the patent
system, but these details are unnecessary for purposes here. The key
legal analysis with respect to the doctrine of PHE is how much the
patentee has “surrendered” during prosecution (usually by amending
her claim). To illustrate, consider a patentee who claims “colored
lights” as a claim element. The patent examiner rejects the claim on
the basis that red lights exist in the prior art; thus, the claim to
“colored lights” violates 35 U.S.C. § 102’s novelty requirement. So
the same result must follow by substantially the same means, does not help much in
application; it is no more than a way of stating the problem. Any decision is therefore
bound to have an arbitrary color, as in all close cases of interpretation, and it is difficult
to give it greater authority than an appeal to the sympathetic understanding of an
impartial reader.
Claude Neon Lights, Inc. v. E. Machlett & Son, 36 F.2d 574, 575–76 (2d Cir. 1929) (citations
omitted).
41. 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
42. Id. at 28–29.
43. Id. at 33–34.
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the patentee amends the element to claim “blue lights,” and the
patent issues. 44 What has the patentee surrendered, thereby
prohibiting access to the DOE? Certainly the patentee cannot claim
that all colored lights fall within equivalents of the “blue light” claim
element, and red lights are clearly not available as equivalents. But
what about green lights? This is the difficult legal question for the
doctrine of PHE.
The traditional approach (pre-Warner-Jenkinson) to the doctrine
of PHE was as a “totality of the circumstances” test, which ordered
courts to determine whether, under the specific facts of the
prosecution, a patent surrender had occurred. 45 This is plainly the
Federal Circuit operating as a decider: indeed, the circumstances
justifying (or not) the application of the doctrine of PHE (and hence
whether the DOE and thus infringement of the patent might lie) were
questions reviewed de novo on appeal. 46
In 2000, however, the Federal Circuit changed its role with
respect to the doctrine of PHE. In Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo VI), 47 an en banc Federal Circuit
reversed itself, holding that a substantive claim amendment would
result in the DOE being unavailable for the amended element. 48 The
reasoning the court used was explicitly managerial in nature:
We believe that the current state of the law regarding the
scope of equivalents that is available when prosecution
history estoppel applies is “unworkable.” In patent law, we
think that rules qualify as “workable” when they can be
relied upon to produce consistent results and give rise to a
body of law that provides guidance to the marketplace on
how to conduct its affairs. After our long experience with
the flexible bar approach, we conclude that its
“workability” is flawed. 49
This change was met with several vigorous dissents at the
Federal Circuit, and was ultimately reversed by the Supreme Court,
44. Set aside questions related to whether the blue lights are obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103
in view of the red lights.
45. See, e.g., Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(stating the rule before Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. relating to PHE).
46. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39 n.8.
47. 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
48. Id. at 575.
49. Id.
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which implemented its own framework that falls somewhere between
the pre-Festo VI and Festo VI approaches. The point here, however,
is that one of the most substantial shifts in patent law doctrine in the
past two decades was prompted primarily (even mostly) by a
reconceptualization of the court’s role in this area, from decider to
manager.
C. The Written Description Requirement
Finally, I note briefly that a current issue before an en banc
Federal Circuit—the “written description” (WD) requirement of 35
U.S.C. § 112—can also be understood as a struggle over the proper
role of the court.
The first paragraph of § 112 provides that the “specification
shall contain a written description of the invention.” 50 In traditional
usage, the WD requirement was thought to do little more than
enforce the filing date requirements: by requiring a patentee to point
to a “written description” to take advantage of an earlier filing date,
the WD requirement helped ensure that the applicant’s claimed
invention was entitled to a particular priority date (date of invention)
and “prevent[ed] an applicant from later asserting that he invented
that which he did not.” 51
This fairly limited role for the WD requirement has been
dramatically expanded by a series of cases interpreting the doctrine
as a freestanding disclosure requirement, above and beyond the
enablement requirement of § 112. 52 This expansion has been met
with resistance by several members of the Federal Circuit, 53
culminating in the court taking the question en banc. 54
Although these cases do not as clearly state the role distinction
of the two prior examples, one can still discern the thread of the
50. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
51. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see
also Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“The cases indicate that
the ‘written description’ requirement most often comes into play where claims not presented in
the application when filed are presented thereafter.”).
52. See, e.g., Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009);
Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 922 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Enzo Biochem, Inc.
v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
53. See, e.g., Ariad, 560 F.3d at 1380 (Linn, J., concurring) (expressing disagreement with
the majority’s imposition of a separate WD requirement on § 112); Enzo, 323 F.3d at 976 (Rader,
J., dissenting from denial of en banc motion).
54. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 332 Fed. App’x. 636 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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decisional role versus the managerial role in the debate over the WD
requirement. Importantly, the expanded version of the WD
requirement (set forth in Enzo, Rochester, and Ariad) contains very
little legal framework to direct courts concerning the analysis. The
articulated test merely states that the applicant must “convey with
reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date
sought, he or she was in possession of the invention” and that “what
is adequate [disclosure] depends upon the context of the claimed
invention.” 55 This sort of open-ended, factually specific analysis is a
hallmark of a decisional approach to the court’s role in the law.
Further, much of the opposition to the expanded WD requirement
adopts a managerial approach, arguing that
[t]he court’s invention of a separate written description
requirement has created confusion as to where the public
and the courts should look to determine the scope of the
patentee’s right to exclude, causing uncertainty in how
inventions are protected, in how the Patent & Trademark
Office discharges its responsibilities, and in how business is
conducted in emerging fields of law. 56
Thus, the current debate over the WD requirement fits neatly
within what I have suggested is the larger (and less visible) struggle
at the Federal Circuit—that over its role atop the patent law.
IV. CONCLUSION
As I argued at the beginning of this Article, any serious analysis
of the Federal Circuit’s role in the patent system (and thus the
institutional design of the nation’s innovation policy) should
understand not only what the Federal Circuit does but also what it is.
By that I mean that a full accounting of the Federal Circuit’s
performance must look beyond the various debates and uncertainties
in patent law and include an understanding of the Federal Circuit as
an institution.
I have argued that the Federal Circuit is an institution struggling
with its role in the patent system. Is it to be the ultimate arbiter of
patent cases, ensuring that the complexities of Title 35 are
appropriately implemented in any given dispute? Or, instead, should
55. Ariad, 560 F.3d at 1371–72.
56. Id. at 1381 (Linn, J., dissenting) (citations and quotations marks omitted).
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it focus on building and developing a rich doctrine of patent law,
enabling all stakeholders to better utilize the patent system? As I
have shown above, these two roles (decisional and managerial) are
often in tension—and play out (unmentioned) in many of the major
contemporary jurisprudential disputes.
What, then, is the “right” role for the Federal Circuit? The real
answer is almost certainly twofold. First, it must be a hybrid of the
two roles, for the court cannot function without either. Second, it is
likely that the court’s role will (and should) change over time. My
own view is that as the patent system grows in scale and complexity,
the need for clear, coherent, and predictable decisional rules
increases—and argues more strongly in favor of the managerial role.
But the opposite may well be the case: as patents matter more in the
marketplace, the correct and efficient resolution of disputes becomes
more important, so the court’s role as a decider remains critical.
In any event, it seems clear that without fully understanding
(and addressing) the role duality I have explored here, our analysis of
the Federal Circuit as an institution will be incomplete.

